# Russia: Land, Tenure, and Assemblies in the 16th and 17th c.

## Introduction

Russia in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries witnessed a wave of territorial expansion, under Ivan IV “the Terrible” (1547-1584). His regime is renowned for its “despotic,” even tyrannical nature, displaying a notorious brutality towards individuals and communities. It seems paradoxical, therefore, that this period also saw the efflorescence of unprecedented representative activity in Russia, especially for perspectives that associate state strength with suppression of society. From the perspective of this argument, however, this is not a coincidence. As we will see, the logic outlined in this book helps us explain this “paradox.” The analysis also allows us to more carefully delineate the aspects of English institutional development that can be truly said to differ from other European practice. These emerge as differences of degree and level of organization.

As Russian historians have long noted, developments in this period have remarkable parallels with western practice. On so many dimensions, land rights, petitions and demands for justice, traits we have observed in England and elsewhere in the West, also appear here. In fact, as the legal historian George Weickhardt has shown, in an analysis that strikingly echoes the analysis of Ottoman land rights in chapter 10, land rights in Russia closely “approached that of the English ‘fee simple,’…the most unqualified type of ownership in Anglo-American common law.”[[1]](#footnote-1) This is not a coincidence, as this book has argued. It stems from the fact that ruler control of land and conditional grants to subjects were common conditions throughout the premodern world—not a trait of “sultanic,” “despotic” regimes of the East. If anything, what distinguished the most “constitutional” of premodern territorial regimes, England, was how effective ruler power was by comparison. Where Russia (and, as argued in the next chapter, the Ottoman Empire as well) differs is in the supra-local organization of collective responsibility, a function of weak ruler capacity.

Just like medieval western European rulers, Ivan IV granted newly conquered land conditionally to military men, who joined the ranks of the service nobility. As a result, this group was more dependent on him than the existing nobility, the *boyars*, who were typically beyond the tsars’ control.[[2]](#footnote-2) The two groups were deeply divided.[[3]](#footnote-3) Crucially, the servitor nobility was the one included in the tsar’s representative institutions and practices—not the *boyars*. As the pattern observed in the West suggests, when the most powerful sector of the nobility was not involved, resulting institutions will be weaker. If that group is not incorporated in the institutional structure, I have argued, however effective the conscription of lower social classes, the institution would not define the nature of the regime as a whole. Instead, this is a case of what I have termed second-best constitutionalism: it exhibits some elements of constitutionalism, but does not extend to the most powerful group.

The power of the *boyars* had generated pressures on the tsars to build up the alternative class of servitors, the *dvoriane*, since the fifteenth century*.* That the *dvoriane* were “less clannish” only enhanced the tsar’s capacity to control them.[[4]](#footnote-4) Its members received about half of the land that Ivan III (1462-1505) confiscated after he conquered Novgorod, which amounted to about 81.7% of total cultivated land, retaining the rest for the royal household.[[5]](#footnote-5) From the 1490s, these Muscovite cavalrymen replaced the Novgorodian landowners, by acquiring lands with peasants that supplied the income necessary for military service in the form of taxes.[[6]](#footnote-6) The fiefs were called *pomest’e* and were distinguished from *votchina*, the hereditary lands held by the *boyars.*[[7]](#footnote-7) *Pomest’e* could not be inherited or sold. If a servitor died without a heir, the fief returned to the Treasury, as did the Ottoman timars and the lands held by tenants-in-chief in England. By contrast, a member of a boyar clan could repurchase a *votchina* within forty years. This is the same right that obtained in England, in the twelfth century, where a heir could buy back land that had reverted to the Crown for its full price, called custom of pre-emption. It was more common on the Continent, where it was called *retrait lignager.*[[8]](#footnote-8)

The *pomest’e* of the servitor class were similar to fiefs, but were established under apparently strong tsarist rule, at the height of monarchical centralization. This has typically been seen as a divergence from Western precedent. [[9]](#footnote-9) In Western Europe, by contrast, fiefs are posited in Russian scholarship to indicate the age of “feudal decentralization.” Yet, this assumed contrast accepts the common premise that feudalism implies fragmentation—i.e. it assumes that the continental version of feudalism is definitive. It ignores the English version, where fief-granting was administered by a highly centralized crown and had political effects precisely because of that, and which some historians consider a more faithful instantiation of feudalism.[[10]](#footnote-10) High levels of concentration in the hands of and dependence on the crown was *the* feature that enabled the social change that shaped regime-type in England, as I have argued.

This dynamic occurs in Russia at the level of this secondary nobility. The dependence on the tsar endowed them with a critical role in local governance. The *dvoriane* secured through petitions, the same mechanism we observed in the West, local councils of elders, the *guba,* in the 1530s. The service nobility thus effectively controlled local government at the behest of the tsar: it was responsible for law and order in the provinces, had control over the local population’s mobility, the distribution of service lands, the gathering of taxes, the mustering of local military forces and the certifying of slavery contracts. The similarities with England are striking and not only with the pre-Civil War decades: agents were locally selected and unpaid, but with personal liabilities if they failed in their obligations, just as English sheriffs and other officials in the medieval period.[[11]](#footnote-11) If a genuine problem exists in determining whether this experiment was genuinely democratic or a “sham” masking state extension, it is one shared by the medieval English polity as well.[[12]](#footnote-12) These innovations were part of a larger program of reassertion of authority over land that preceded Ivan IV, with surveying also carried out in the 1530s.[[13]](#footnote-13) Consequently, by “the mid-sixteenth century almost the entire population owed substantial obligations to the state.”[[14]](#footnote-14)

The role of the servitor class in local organization was also reflected at the center. After the reforms of the 1550s, the elite servitors staffed the sovereign’s court.[[15]](#footnote-15) However, they did not thereby acquire the capacity to act collectively. The class developed an elaborate rank structure, a complicated system of rules of precedence (*mestnichestvo*) that caused its gradual fragmentation, undermining its capacity to check the autocratic power of the ruler, unlike in the West. The class was further weakened by retaining the (more equitable) system of partible inheritance,[[16]](#footnote-16) which distributed land to all heirs. Both were in contrast to English practices, where the aristocracy was subjected to a uniform system of royal law and applied primogeniture. The more a group departed from concentrated practices, the weaker its collective organization.

Nonetheless, the servitor class was the critical actor in the assemblies that began to be called in 1549 for fiscal difficulties due to war and which ended by the mid-1600s.[[17]](#footnote-17) These Assemblies of the Land (*zemskii sobor*) had no formal procedure, elections or quotas; “sometimes the instructions requested that as many representatives as desired should come.” Depending on the criteria of social composition, about 15 to 60 assemblies are believed to have been held.[[18]](#footnote-18) They occasionally took radical political action: Boris Godunov was elected, with particularly broad representation, including black peasants, in the Assembly of 1598 and Mikhail Fedorovich (Michael I) was elected in 1613, closing the Time of Troubles. It must be noted that nothing politically equivalent had yet occurred in England or France (though the Holy Roman Empire did practice election). The assembly sat in continuous sessions until 1622, to reconsolidate the war-torn bureaucracy. Ratification of a law code occurred in the Assembly of 1649, in the midst of urban riots. The last assembly met in 1653.[[19]](#footnote-19)

 Soviet historians have portrayed this as a period of “estate-representative monarchy,” an assessment questioned by Western historians.[[20]](#footnote-20) Nonetheless, the composition of these assemblies was not different than that of Western ones and included “members of the middle service class, church officials, merchants, advisers to the tsar, civil administrators, and in the seventeenth century, townsmen.”[[21]](#footnote-21)

When Western historiography interprets these Assemblies as simply an instrument of the tsar, the key reason invoked is that no estates existed in Russia, no legally recognized corporative entities with established rights; society was stratified in terms of “ranks” (*chiny*), instead, which defined positions vis-à-vis the tsar. “Participants in [assemblies] were considered to be performing state service and received pay from the treasury; attendance was a duty, not a right.”[[22]](#footnote-22) However, these criteria—obligatory service and, as will be shown in the next chapter, lack of corporative status and entrenched rights for representatives—could be repeated almost verbatim about England. They cannot therefore serve to account for the differential outcomes in the Russian case.

The key critical difference, instead, was this: Russian tsars were weaker than English kings in the period under consideration here.[[23]](#footnote-23) They were thus less able to apply the pattern of governance with the servitors across society, including the most powerful, and to sustain it over time. Despite the autocratic façade, underlying power dynamics were very fragmented.[[24]](#footnote-24) Scholars note that the “persistent emphasis in Muscovite sources on the sovereign’s exclusive autocratic power is striking, given that the boyars also held real, albeit not institutionalized, power.”[[25]](#footnote-25) Established scholarship now substitutes a network of interconnected patriarchal boyar clans as the real ruling force in the Kremlin.[[26]](#footnote-26) The concept of normative/empirical inversion that has repeatedly been identified in European dynamics is highly applicable in this context as well: it was precisely the real power of the *boyars* that made such autocratic discourse necessary.

Tsarist weakness can be observed on five levels: their weak control over the *boyars*; their poor taxing capability, especially over the most powerful social actors; the mass enserfment of peasants by the servitor class; the lack of institutional fusion between the different instruments of governance, mostly the Duma and the occasional assemblies; and the lack of collective organization imposed at the local level on the servitor class. The limited collective organization in Russia was part of a broader pattern of difference across these cases, and will be examined more fully in the next chapter.

*Weak control over boyars.* The *boyars* were the highest level of the nobility and were major landowners.[[27]](#footnote-27) Their land was held allodially, as *votchina*. If the boyar died without male heirs, his land did not revert to the Treasury, but could go even to his daughters, according to the Russian law code of the early twelfth century;[[28]](#footnote-28) it was therefore a form of absolute property. *Boyar* land could be freely sold. *Boyars* relied less on slaves than other landowners, however, as most of their land was rented out.[[29]](#footnote-29)

Although almost all boyars performed military service, this was not a tenurial obligation, but due to economic reasons. They were more like modern state citizens, having an obligation to make some contribution to the state but free to move. They were allowed by customary law to serve any prince; they could even serve a foreign ruler, such as the Great Prince of Lithuania, a right affirmed in treaties. They could also leave a prince through the right of renunciation (*otkaz*).[[30]](#footnote-30)

The period of state consolidation under Ivan III, starting with the 1470s, saw a concerted effort to undermine these privileges of the *boyars*. The right of free departure was honored until the 1530s. But tsars started extracting oaths for service, as well as security deposits in case of breach of oath, so collective responsibility was imposed to ensure compliance. Also, documentation started being required from the chancery as necessary for any travel; it could be refused and the rank of the *boyar* lowered without it, which would damage his career.[[31]](#footnote-31) But enforcement was difficult: as *boyars* often avoided the obligation, a “stream of decrees threatening dire punishment” was issued.[[32]](#footnote-32)

A major component of the state consolidation program was the effort to shift the land regime from allodial to conditional. Although Russian specialists denounce stereotypes, the historian Richard Pipes took this step as exemplary of the regime’s character as unfree and absolutist. In “no other European land was the sovereign able to make all non-clerical landholding conditional upon the performance of service to him.”[[33]](#footnote-33) Such a program has ensconced the assumed tight link between absolutism and total control of economic resources: “It was the combination of absolute political power with nearly complete control of the country’s productive resources that made the Muscovite monarchy so formidable an institution.”[[34]](#footnote-34)

Two important revisions need to be made to this picture, however. First, as Weickhardt has argued, conditional land-holding would have made Russia more similar to England, so in and of itself it cannot be assumed to explain observed political outcomes.[[35]](#footnote-35) Further, expropriations were permissible, just as in England and the Ottoman Empire, for serious crimes, though rulers in all cases could and did violate the law.[[36]](#footnote-36) At the same time, however, the reality of power was in stark contrast to the theory; it resembles closely the disjuncture between absolutist rhetoric and weak infrastructural control we have observed in Continental European cases, such as France and Castile.[[37]](#footnote-37)

For instance, the classic exemplar of tsarist tyranny has been Ivan IV's formation of the *Oprichnina*, when he reserved a section of the kingdom for his personal management in 1564. This was accompanied by a mass slaughter of 3,000 people and the exile of 190 princes.[[38]](#footnote-38) Moreover, “Ivan’s henchmen, the notorious *oprichniki*, among their many barbarous acts ‘collected as much rent from their peasants in one year as usually was collected in ten years’… The result was that ensuing censuses found up to 85 per cent of the heartland of Muscovy, especially around Moscow and Novgorod, abandoned…”[[39]](#footnote-39)

However, Ivan’s retreat from Moscow was generated by fear—of court intrigue, of foreign relations failures, of danger to his family.[[40]](#footnote-40) It was the incapacity to control the *boyars* that elicited the move. The public part of the kingdom, the *zemschina,* was ruled by the *boyar* council and was out of the control of the tsar. Many of the exiled princes were able to return. Although the evidence on the type of land mostly confiscated—*boyar* or servitor—is not clear-cut, the consensus is that inroads were greater on service than boyar land.[[41]](#footnote-41) The critical point is that the tsar was unable to control a substantial part of the polity, so Muscovy “found itself with two administrations, two armies and two separate groups of territories”—one controlled by the tsar, another by the *boyars.*[[42]](#footnote-42) The terror of the reign, as typical, stemmed from weakness (although “paranoia” is also detected[[43]](#footnote-43)), not strength.[[44]](#footnote-44) The greater the weakness and threat, the more the resort to violence and cruelty. The perception of the rule as extreme distorts the understanding of reported empirical evidence.

*Poor taxing capability of tsars.* Weak state capacity was also reflected in the major indicator, fiscal extraction. Fiscal exemptions were so widely prevalent that the Russian tax system is mostly known through charters granting immunities, with surviving documents dating mostly from and after the fifteenth century.[[45]](#footnote-45) The most privileged status was enjoyed by the nobility in particular, due to special terms secured during feudal wars of the fifteenth century.[[46]](#footnote-46) Whether immunities were increasing or not in the early sixteenth century has been the topic of unresolved historical controversy.[[47]](#footnote-47) However, *new* immunities were phased out after the 1530s, when strong state-building efforts were underway, as the argument in this book suggests.

This pathology extended into the seventeenth century, typically described, in ominous terms, as the “height of monarchical centralization.”[[48]](#footnote-48) The assessment draws on another mass distribution of court land and “black lands” to the servitors. These lands were the major sources for tax revenue, the former directly under the control of the prince, the latter being state lands populated by peasants that the prince could freely grant to private proprietors.[[49]](#footnote-49) By “the early seventeenth century black lands had almost disappeared from the heartland of the Moscow state, and with them vanished most of the independent [tax-paying] peasants living in self-governing communities.”[[50]](#footnote-50) Far from monarchical centralization, what this implied was a massive privatization of state land. By the late 1650s, 67% of the households subject to fiscal and other obligations (*tiaglo*) stood on *boyar* and *dvoriane* land and 13% in the hands of the church, i.e. the crown owned outright only 9.3%. Four out of five Russians “ceased to be subjects of the state,” and thus taxable, a condition formalized in the Code of 1649.[[51]](#footnote-51) The incapacity to impose broadly-based royal taxation emerges again as a symptom of an absolutist image which in fact conceals infrastructural weakness.

*Mass enserfment of peasants by the servitor class.* State weakness vis-à-vis the lords was the key reason for the other major aspect of early modern Russian history, the mass enserfment of the peasants. This is traditionally considered as the major point of divergence between Russia and the Western absolutist monarchies, where the peasantry achieved greater freedom after the Black Death.[[52]](#footnote-52) This again is considered evidence of the “absolutist” nature of the regime: “Among the hundreds of articles defining the power of landlords over their peasants there is not one which sets on it any limits.” The code forbade peasants “to lodge complaints against landlords unless state security was involved (when they were required to do so)”, thus depriving them of the right to testify in court in civil disputes. It also recognized them as chattels, making them “personally liable for debts of bankrupt landlords.”[[53]](#footnote-53)

But in doing so, the Code was implementing servitor *landlord* interests, not just the tsar’s own statist agenda; such extreme provisions reflected the power of the class they benefited, not the state. It is not by accident this change occurred just as service land was being transformed into hereditary private property, though the long-standing tradition of such property rights in the Russian Law of the twelfth century provided the template.[[54]](#footnote-54)The main underlying problem was the state’s incapacity to protect the peasants of the servitor class from the depredations of the *boyars* and the church: the latter would simply encroach on the workers of less powerful servitors and deplete them of their revenue.[[55]](#footnote-55)

As a result, in the 1580s the government began to repeal the right of peasants, who lived on the lands of selected landholders, to move on St George’s Day. “In 1592 this prohibition was extended ‘until further notice’ to all peasants.” The purpose was to ensure that the peasants in the lands of the provincial servitor class remained stable, since the servitors could not render military service in the absence of peasant rent-payers.[[56]](#footnote-56) It was “gentry landlords and urban communes [who] agitated for increasingly active state intervention in enforcing these norms, recovering runaways, penalizing those who harbored fugitives, and closing loopholes for escape into border regiments and frontier towns.”[[57]](#footnote-57)

This enserfment of Russian peasants is usually taken as a symptom of its authoritarian structure and as a cause of its political and economic underdevelopment. Yet, the restrictions passed were little different than those that applied in England at an earlier period of labor scarcity, triggered then by the Black Death. After the 1340s, the peasant labor force in England was stabilized through royal statutes, especially the Statute of Labourers of 1351, enforced by institutions of local governance.[[58]](#footnote-58) Although the statute failed to secure a cap on wages,[[59]](#footnote-59) labor mobility was restricted through an institutional network at the county and the parish level. Successive laws were passed in Parliament in the decades following the first Statute and parts of the regulations still survived into the eighteenth century and were only removed from the statute books “after heated debate” in 1814.[[60]](#footnote-60) The restrictions on labor movement were, after all, a major concern in Adam Smith’s *Wealth of Nations*.[[61]](#footnote-61) Detailed local studies have shown an “exceptional” level of enforcement of the statutes across regions.[[62]](#footnote-62) In fact, it was the pre-existing integration of subjects down to the level of the village in the machinery of law enforcement, through processes described in chapters 2 and 3, that allowed locals to participate in efforts to control labor.[[63]](#footnote-63)

In other words, the extensive institutional infrastructure in England, predicated on royal enforcement, permitted the relative control of labor through laws and regulations; in Russia, such infrastructure was lacking in the sixteenth century and personal forms of domination prevailed. So, the same restrictive measures in the two cases appear as regulations in one case and slavery in the other. The missing dimension is the capacity of the state to depersonalize coercion through law. But again, coercion is the response to weakness. And although in Russia the major threat were the *boyars*, who could poach servitor peasants, in England, as the sociologist Richard Lachmann pointed out,[[64]](#footnote-64) the capacity of the Crown and Church to constrain the landlords was critical in preventing Eastern European outcomes. However, the constraint did not mean as much greater mobility of laborers, as it meant greater compliance with the tenurial regime, less poaching from weaker landlords, and a relatively more effective regulation of labor, which prevented the re-establishment of serfdom in England.

The mass enserfment of peasants by the Russian servitor class can thus be seen, through a comparison with English conditions, as another indicator of ruler weakness in the Russian case (rather than, as typically seen, a sign of its “absolutism,”) together with weak control over the highest level of the nobility (the boyars), and a poor taxing capability, especially over the most powerful social actors. These are also the conditions that inhibit the creation of a centralized and broadly inclusive representative institution, as seen on the European continent. And underlying these conditions was the tenurial system of land: the more it was effectively concentrated in the hands of the ruler and distributed conditionally, the more the ties of dependency enabled the creation of institutions that furthered political participation.

Two further conditions that flowed from the above set of conditions were of central importance: the lack of institutional fusion between the different instruments of governance, the Duma and the occasional assemblies, and the lack of collective organization imposed on the servitor class through such a centralized institution, which I pursue more fully in the final chapter.

*Lack of institutional fusion between the Duma and the occasional assemblies*. In Chapters 2 and 3, we have seen the importance of institutional fusion for the emergence of the English in the English case and the inhibiting effects that separation of the judicial and political functions had in the early period of institutional formation in the French case. As noted, this is contrary to the normative prescriptions of mature constitutionalism, which prescribes a separation of powers. Under conditions of weak state control, the de facto separation of powers between the *Duma* and the Assemblies of the Land in Russia only exacerbated the weakness of these political institutions.

The tsar’s council, the *Duma,* is traditionally interpreted as evidence of the “absolutist” character of the Russian regime. Yet it, too, has striking similarities with English practice. For instance, *Duma* attendees did not have corporative status; they received instead “personal invitations.” In Russian scholarship, this is a sign of the illiberal, controlling character of the regime.[[65]](#footnote-65) These invites are however equivalent to the English summons to Parliament. It is perhaps not an accident that the antecedents of the *Duma* may be in the Norman period.[[66]](#footnote-66) It was a regular council, and even though attendance was not fixed and varied by occasion, it was confined to the *boyars.*[[67]](#footnote-67) The *boyars* participated in decreeing some of the most significant acts of the government: law codes, foreign treaties, and other precedent-setting measures.[[68]](#footnote-68)

The *Duma*, like all premodern royal councils, also had judicial functions. The Grand Prince was actively involved in cases, especially concerning land, in the late fifteenth century. The ruler’s justice was one of the highest privileges that could be bestowed on a subject.[[69]](#footnote-69) But the *boyars* acquired a separate court in 1497,[[70]](#footnote-70) so the most powerful actors were excluded from the regular business of justice—a feature which, in the English case, was critical for institutional consolidation.

On the other hand, the Assemblies of the Land, described above, that drew broader sections of the population, were not tied to the *Duma* or to regular judicial business, as in the English Parliament. They were irregular and convoked the “non-taxpaying social groups on issues like war, dynastic succession, and peace.”[[71]](#footnote-71) The conditions for institutional fusion observed in England were thus absent: there, irregular fiscal negotiations were layered onto judicial business, which was regular, within the same institution, Parliament. The English kings were strong enough to compel service and attendance even on the highest levels of the nobility, thus ensuring a broader basis of representation, in addition to the urban and rural representatives. Instead, the Russian trajectory was closer to that of France, where broader assemblies (the Estates-General) occurred intermittently but were never conjoined to the regular judicial institution of the *Parlement*.

*Lack of collective organization imposed on the servitor class.* The provincial gentrymen remained linked to the center in a manner that was “limited, individualized, and fragmentary.”[[72]](#footnote-72) Their autonomy allowed them to engage in “highly particularistic, local competitions.” Local institutions did not develop a collective sense of rights like the English Parliament or even the French *parlements* did—but there was a very strong sense of “what they expected as their due, an understanding of their “rights” that was couched in the language of right and wrong rather than that of corporative charters of laws.”[[73]](#footnote-73) Individual abuses were actively opposed, but there was weak institutionalized effort to stop them. It was only towards the end of the seventeenth century that some corporative identity developed, with some measure of pluralism.[[74]](#footnote-74) But this was not adequate to shape the regime as a whole in a pluralist mode. I explore the various dimensions of these differences in the concluding chapter.

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1. Weickhardt (1993, 665), Weickhardt (1994). [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. Hosking (2001, 92-6). [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. Martin (1995, 280-3), Farrow (2004, 34-6). [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. Pipes (1974, 92). [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. Pipes (1974, 93). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. Hellie (2006a, 382). In addition, other servitors were maintained as vicegerents (*namestniki* and *volosteli*) through *kormlenie* grants, which were of limited tenure, and through outright stipends given by the grand prince; Ostrowski (2006, 225). [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. Pipes (1974, 92-3), Graham (1987). [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. Pipes (1974, 93), Baker (2002, 262). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Pipes (1974, 100). [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. See Parts 2 and 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. Kivelson (1996, 144-5), Morris and Strayer (1940, 49). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. Morris and Strayer (1940, 149). [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. Bogatyrev (2006, 253). [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. Zlotnik (1979, 244). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. Bogatyrev (2006, 254). [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Kivelson (1994, 212), Kivelson (1994, 198-9).. [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. Brown (1983, 78). The term *zemskii sobor* was invented in the nineteenth century; Brown (1983, 90), Hellie (1987). [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Brown (1983, 79, 82, 84). [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. Pipes (1974, 107). [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. Brown (1983, 78-81). [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Attendance is covered in detail in Hellie (1987, 229-231). [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. Pipes (1974, 107). [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. This structural feature had consequences over the long term, shaping the constraints on monarchs aiming to increase imperial power, such as Catherine the Great. [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Kollmann (1987, 146-180). [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. Kollmann (1987, 8). [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Kivelson (1994, 198), Keenan (1986), Kollmann (1987), Crummey (1983). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. Kollmann (1987, 37-46). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. Weickhardt (1996, 5). [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. Crummey (1981), Pipes (1974, 46). [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. Pipes (1974, 47). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. Pipes (1974, 88). [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. Pipes (1974, 89). [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. Blum (1961, 169). Similarly, Pipes held that it “had profound implications for the future course of Russian history. It meant nothing less than the elimination of private property in land;” Pipes (1974, 93). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. Pipes (1974, 94). [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. Weickhardt (1993). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. Weickhardt (1992). [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. Elsewhere, Pipes concedes this: “Behind the façade of monopolistic and autocratic monarchy survived powerful vestiges of the appanage era…Annexation was often a mere formality…” Pipes (1974, 89). [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. Bogatyrev (2006, 259). [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. Hellie (2006b, 293-4). [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Bogatyrev (2006, 257). [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Farrow (2004, 35). [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. Crummey (1987, 162). [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. Pipes (1974, 100). [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. “Ivan's excesses, reportedly involving boiling men alive and frying them in special man-sized frying pans, raised violence to an elaborate and gruesome art, but the bread-and-butter cruelty of officially prescribed punishment is also stunning;” Kivelson (1997, 656), Staden and Esper (1967). For Ivan’s paranoia, see Hellie (2006b, 293). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. Dewey (1964), Froianov (1986). [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. Floria (2000, 18), Kollmann (2002, 31-3). [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. Dewey (1964). [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. Pipes (1974, 100). [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Blum (1961, 93). [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. Pipes (1974, 104), Blum (1961, 93). [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Pipes (1974, 104). [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. Weickhardt (1993, 678). [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Pipes (1974, 104, 103). [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. Weickhardt (1993, 678). [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. Kivelson (1996, 649). [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. Hellie (2006b, 296). [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. Kivelson (1996, 649). [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Putnam (1908), Given-Wilson (2000). [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. Penn and Dyer (1990) [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. Bennett (2010, 7). In just the decade following enactment, 664 officials were appointed for the enforcement of the statute and their work was closely integrated with that of the justices of the peace; Putnam (1906, 527). Although mobility was observed and prices certainly failed to remain under the legislated levels, movement was not as extensive so as to destabilize the system. A neglected source of labor was also key in maintaining necessary employment levels: compelled service by villeins, including women, as recently highlighted by Bennett (2010). [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. Smith ([1776] 1981) [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. Poos (1983, 50) [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. Poos (1983). [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. Lachmann (1985, 360). [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. Pipes (1974, 107). [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. Pipes (1974, 106). [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Crummey (1981), Crummey (1987, 12-3, 103-5). [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. Ostrowski (2006, 225). “Other, less important decrees, such as *kormlenie* (‘feeding’), *votchina*, and *pomest’e* grants, judicial immunities, local agreements, etc., were clearly the prerogative of the ruler alone;” Ostrowski (2006, 225). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. Kleimola (1975, 11). [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. Kleimola (1975, 13, 15). [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. Kollmann (1987, 185). [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. Kivelson (1996, 152). [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. Kivelson (1996, 152). [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. Keep (1970) [↑](#footnote-ref-74)